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Post by Jennifer Chacón, Professor of Law at University of California, Irvine.
On March 6, 2018, the Department of Justice  led a lawsuit against the State of California
challenging three California laws, on the basis that they are preempted by federal
immigration law.
Under U.S. law, the federal government has broad power to regulate immigration. 
Individual states like California cannot regulate immigration – that is, they cannot decide
whom to admit or deport, and they have no power to remove someone from the state on the
basis of immigration status.  The admission and removal of immigrants are federal
prerogatives.
That said, states and localities can – and
do – engage in all manner of legal
regulations that affect the lives of
immigrants.  States regulate conditions
of employment, determine the criteria
for public support for higher education,
provide health bene ts to residents,
control the state’s substantive criminal
law and enforce state law through their
own enforcement bodies and courts. 
State laws and state enforcement practices therefore play a signi cant and direct role in
shaping the lives of immigrants who reside in a state.  The same is true of localities.  Cities
have their own police forces and their own enforcement priorities.  They control local
zoning, help set policies for local schools, and enact a host of local ordinances that affect
the lives of their residents, including their immigrant residents.
For the most part, states and localities can enact laws and policies that impact their
immigrant residents without running afoul of or creating con ict with federal law.  So, for
example, California has a law that allows certain students, including some who lack legal
immigration status, to qualify for in-state tuition at state universities.  This law does not
con ict with federal immigration law.  Indeed, the relevant federal statute appears to
concede the power to decide this matter to the states.  Similarly, some states and localities
have laws or policies that prohibit police of cers from making inquiries into immigration
status during investigative stops.  There is no federal law that requires such inquiries.
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States and localities that decide that such laws enhance public safety therefore have the
ability to enact such policies as part of their general police power.
When a state or local law con icts with a federal law that expressly prohibits the state or
local action in question, such a law does violate the Constitution.  Sometimes, even if the
law is not expressly forbidden, federal courts will nevertheless  nd that it is preempted
because it con icts with federal law or because it presents an obstacle to federal law.
These are the arguments at issue in the lawsuit  led by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against California on March 6, 2018.  The Department is arguing that three of California’s
laws are preempted by federal immigration law.  The  rst is Assembly Bill (AB) 450 – the
Immigrant Worker Protection Act – which provides that an employer or its agents “shall not
provide voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter any nonpublic
areas of a place of labor” unless the agent can produce a judicial warrant.  There is a similar
provision to prohibit voluntary access to employer records.  AB 450 also requires employers
to give employees 72 hours notice before allowing ICE inspection of documents through a
“Notice of Inspection.”  And it prohibits employers for engaging in veri cation of
immigration status over and above what is required by federal law.
The second challenged provision is AB 103, which provides for inspection of all facilities
that house immigrant detainees and allows state of cials to examine the “due process”
provided to the immigrant detainees and to assess “the circumstances around their
apprehension and transfer to the facility.” The complaint alleges that state of cials already
have made inquiries for documentary evidence and have inspected facilities under this law.
The third challenged provision is Senate Bill 54 which prohibits state and local of cials
other than employees of the California Department of Corrections from “[p]roviding
information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for noti cation by
providing release dates or other information;” “providing personal information”; and
“transfer[ring] an individual to immigration authority.”  This law exempts a huge swath of
the incarcerated population from these protections on the basis of their crime of
conviction.  And it always allows transfers where there is a judicial warrant.  The law is only
designed to protect against warrantless transfers upon administrative request and to
protect the private information of all individuals in state custody from being shared absent
a judicial order. In the complaint, DOJ asserts that California blocks the sharing of
information about immigration status and “does not impose these restrictions on other
forms of information sharing on other topics” – which is odd because the law is not limited
by topic and is generally designed to protect personal information.  
Will DOJ prevail?  That is not clear.  The doctrine of preemption is complicated and the
existing case law is full of internal contradictions.  In the end, the outcome of the case will
more likely depend on the political views of the judges deciding the case than on abstract
principles of preemption.  The simple truth is that although the California laws certainly
increases the transaction costs of federal enforcement of immigration law, it is not clear
that they are preempted.  Some recent history helps to illustrate the point.
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This is not the  rst time that the federal government has sued a state over its immigration
policy.  Memorably, the Obama administration sued the state of Arizona over S.B. 1070 – a
state law that (among other things) required state of cials, where practicable, to inquire
about immigration status when making routine stops.  (SB1070 Section 2). Section 287 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) directly governs how and when state police can
participate in immigration enforcement efforts and the Arizona provision clearly fell
outside of those guidelines, but all nine Justices still concluded that Section 2 of S.B. 1070
was not preempted.  In other words, the Supreme Court has shown itself reluctant to strike
down state laws on the basis of the broad language of the INA’s enforcement provisions.  If
that trend were to hold, then the challenge to SB 54 would fail.  Nothing that California is
doing through SB 54 violates the speci c language in the INA that the DOJ cites in its
complaint.
One could argue that Congress intends for immigration law to be enforced, and that
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 provision was therefore in harmony with federal objectives whereas the
California law is not.  But Congress has expressed various concerns in the enactment of
immigration laws, including antidiscrimination concerns.  California’s laws could be seen as
prioritizing certain Congressional values, just as the Arizona law clearly prioritized others. 
The fact that the administration shares different priorities and does not like the laws does
not mean that they are preempted; the Arizona litigation illustrates the point.
Of course, given the shifting politics, there is no guarantee that the outcome in the Arizona
case will dictate the result of the DOJ’s challenge to California.  For some justices, it may be
 ne to interfere with federal law through overzealous enforcement but not to interfere
through the elevation of its residents’ privacy and liberty interests over federal immigration
enforcement objectives.  Politics and power, not preemption, will be the true core of the
decision in this case.
The legal landscape on the other challenges looks similar.  Unlike the employment
provisions at issue in Arizona’s SB 1070, the California law is not a regulation of the
employment of immigrants – something the court found to be preempted by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).  In 2011, in a case called Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting, the court very narrowly interpreted IRCA’s preemption provisions.  It
does not seem that this narrow preemption provision would cover AB 450.   AB 450 is a rule
on when employers can voluntarily expose all of their employees to enforcement efforts,
not a rule on the hiring of unauthorized workers. The DOJ complaint argues that AB 450 is
preempted by the INA’s requirements that states not prohibit communications about
immigration status, but that is not at all clear from the language of the statute. 
Finally, the law that applies to detention facilities may be preempted because it deals with
immigration enforcement facilities.  But this is not the  rst time states have played a role in
inspecting federal detention facilities for compliance with state law.  For example, when
children were being detained in immigration detention facilities in Texas and those
facilities were not licensed under state law to care for minors, a Texas state court judge got
involved.  It seems unlikely that generally applicable state regulations of facilities would be
preempted by immigration law.  It may be a harder question as to whether California’s law,





which is speci cally aimed at immigration detention centers, is preempted.  But the DOJ
complaint certainly doesn’t do a great job of pointing to the statutory language that would
result in such preemption.  
Ultimately, there is no slam dunk argument for preemption.  But if I were a betting woman,
I might still place my money on DOJ.  Trump’s administration has worked quickly and
effectively to reshape the federal judiciary from the Supreme Court down.  In cases like this,
that fact could make all the difference.
Any comments about this post? Get in touch with us! Send us an email, or post a comment here
or on Facebook. You can also tweet us.
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